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ABSTRACT
We use administrative data on North Carolina public schools to document the tendency for more
highly qualified teachers to be matched with more advantaged students, and we measure the bias this
pattern  generates  in  estimates  of  the  impacts  of  various  teacher  qualifications  on  student
achievement. One of the strategies we use to minimize this bias is to restrict the analysis to schools
that  assign  students  to  classrooms  in  a  manner  statistically  indistinguishable  from  random
assignment. Using data for 5th grade, we consistently find significant returns to teacher experience
in both math and reading and to licensure test scores in math achievement. We also find that the
returns in math are greater for socioeconomically advantaged students, a finding that may help
explain why the observed form of teacher-student matching persists in equilibrium.
Charles T. Clotfelter






Helen F. Ladd 











jacob.vigdor@duke.edu1 See, for example, Darling-Hammond 2000 and American School Board Journal 1999.  That public policy
also recognizes the importance of having highly qualified teachers in every classroom is indicated by government
regulation at many levels including standards for highly qualified teachers mandated by the Federal No Child Left
Behind Act, state-level licensing requirements, and local hiring practices. 
2The Nye et al. (2004) study, which uses data from the Tennessee STAR experiment, may be immune to
this criticism, since it estimates teacher fixed effects within schools where students were assigned to classrooms
randomly.  There have been a number of criticisms of the randomization process in the Tennessee STAR experiment,
however; see Krueger (1999) for a discussion.  See Todd and Wolpin (2003) for a general discussion of omitted
variables bias in models of student achievement.
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1. Introduction
 Nearly all observers of the education process, including scholars, school administrators,
policy-makers, and parents, point to teacher quality as the most significant institutional
determinant of academic success.
1  Considerable uncertainty remains, however, concerning
exactly which aspects of teachers are important, whether those aspects can be measured, and
whether that effectiveness differs by type of student.  Recent studies by Rivkin, Hanushek and
Kain (2005), Hanushek, Kain, O’Brien and Rivkin (2005), Ballou, Sanders and Wright (2004),
Rockoff (2004), Nye, Konstantopoulos and Hedges (2004) and Aaronson, Barrow and Sander
(2003), for example, find evidence of significant across-teacher variation in student test scores,
but find little evidence that any observable teacher characteristic, save experience, explains any
of this variation.
Estimates of the impact of teacher characteristics in studies like these will be biased in
situations where non-random sorting of students and teachers into schools and classrooms
introduce correlations between the included characteristics and unobserved determinants of
student test scores.
2 This paper examines the extent to which the non-random matching of
teachers to students generated by these sorting processes affects estimates of the relationship
between teacher characteristics and student achievement.  Our goals are both to provide new3 Ultimately, teacher fixed-effects models are unsatisfying to policy-makers because they are observable
only ex post.  Identifying important credentials and characteristics is of greater value in this regard.  A teacher’s
characteristics are not the only determinant of a teacher’s effectiveness, of course. A more complete measure of
teacher quality would require the direct observation of classroom performance in a wide variety of standardized
settings or the use of teacher portfolios, both of which are expensive means of gathering information on teaching
quality.
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evidence on this policy-relevant behavior and to illustrate how rich administrative data can be
used to approximate the results that would emerge from  a random experiment.   
We begin by documenting the extent of non-random teacher-student matching, using an
administrative data set covering the population of elementary students in the State of North
Carolina, which matches most students to their individual classroom teachers.  Consistent with
previous evidence, we find that  teachers with more experience, degrees from more competitive
colleges, and advanced degrees tend to teach at schools serving more affluent, higher achieving
and whiter populations. We find additional evidence that even within schools, teachers with
stronger credentials tend to teach more affluent students.  This evidence is consistent with
existing research on teacher labor market sorting and parental efforts to secure better resources
for their children.
We then examine how the sorting of teachers and students affects estimates of teacher
effectiveness.  In contrast to some recent studies, which estimate achievement models with
teacher fixed effects and then regress the fixed effects on observable characteristics (see, e.g.,
Nye, Konstantopoulos and Hedges 2004 or Aaronson, Barrow and Sander 2003), we focus on the
direct estimation of the relationship between teacher credentials and student outcomes.
3  Any bias
uncovered in our analysis, it should be noted, applies with equal force to models that employ
teacher fixed effects.
We employ three strategies to counter the bias that arises from the processes of sorting4While we cannot prove that assignment is truly random in these schools, any within school sorting of
students would have to be uncorrelated with a vector of six student characteristics including measures of past
achievement, socioeconomic status, and race.  The ratio of selection on unobservables to selection on observables
would have to be very high to attribute the results we obtain to selection (Altonji, Elder and Taber, 2002). 
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that arise across and within schools: the addition of an extended set of student-level control
variables, the use of school fixed effects, and the use of a subsample of the schools that feature
relatively balanced distributions of students across classrooms, based on observable
characteristics.
4  Our results suggest that the bias from between-school sorting is large; the bias
associated with sorting within schools, by contrast, is more limited in nature and may actually
vary in sign across subsamples of schools.  Ultimately, two characteristics – teacher experience
and licensure test scores – emerge as robust determinants of test scores for fifth grade students.
Additional tests for differential effects by type of student provide suggestive evidence 
that the math score returns to teacher attributes are higher for more advantaged, higher
performing students. This finding implies, first, that  efforts to increase the math achievement of
low-performing students by assigning them more experienced teachers could reduce average
math test scores, potentially setting the stage for a classic equity-efficiency tradeoff.  Second, it
provides an additional possible explanation for the observed equilibrium patterns of teacher
assignment that favor more advantaged students.
2. Sorting, non-random matching, and the potential for bias in estimated teacher effects
The principal empirical strategy  used in the economics literature to assess the importance
of teachers and teacher characteristics is the estimation of education production functions, which
generally take the form:5 Although many economists would argue that a more relevant outcome is returns in the labor market (see
Card and Kreuger, 1992, and Betts, 1996), achievement test scores have the advantage of being available at the time
the education is provided, of being of interest for their own sake, and of being a proxy, albeit imperfect, for future
success in the labor market (Ferguson and Ladd, 1996).
6 Typically omitted from the standard model are unmeasured characteristics of students, such as their ability
and motivation, that affect achievement. Provided such variables have constant effects on achievement over time and
that their effects deteriorate at the same rates as prior achievement, they cancel out in this lagged form of the
production function. See Boardman and Murnane (1979) for other assumptions that would generate this particular
form of the production function. In an assessment of the econometric issues raised by such models, Todd and Wolpin
(2003) argue that the value-added versioni of the model (* = 1) assumes that inputs have the same effects at all grade
levels, while the explicitly estimated version (lagged achievement) assumes that the effects of inputs decay over time
at a constant rate. Constraining * to zero implies that only contemporaneous inputs matter.
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(1) yijt = *yijt-1 + $1Xit + $2Xjt + ,ijt
where i indexes students, j indexes classrooms, and t indexes time ( Rivkin, Hanushek and  Kain,
2005; summaries by Hanushek, 1986, 1997, 2002; Goldhaber and Brewer, 2000; Summers and
Wolfe,1977; and Coleman et al., 1966).  The dependent variable is a standardized test score.
5 
The lagged test score is typically included in the equation to reflect the cumulative nature of the
education process and is intended to pick up the effects of prior year school and family
characteristics.  The parameter * is in many cases constrained to be equal to one.  In other cases,
such as in studies for which lagged test scores are unavailable or in studies using adult outcomes
as the dependent variable, * may be constrained to zero.  In still other cases, the parameter * is
estimated explicitly.
6  The vector Xit measures the characteristics of student i at time t, and may
contain time-invariant characteristics such as student gender or race.  The vector Xjt represents
measurable school inputs, including class size as well as teacher characteristics.  Recent literature
has included teacher fixed effects as elements of Xjt.
Obtaining unbiased estimates of $2, the marginal effects of school inputs is difficult
because parent- or teacher-driven processes of across-school and within-school sorting are likely
to lead to a situation in which observable characteristics of students, teachers and classrooms are7 The kind of non-random sorting observed in schools has similarities to job training programs.  LaLonde
(1986) compares experimental and non-experimental estimation strategies in that latter application.
8 Empirical studies of teacher moves and quits reveal that teachers are more likely to switch schools within
a district, move from one district to another, or quit altogether if their original school has a higher percentage of low-
achieving, low-income, or minority students or a high student-teacher ratio  See New York Public Education
Association (1955), Mont and Rees (1996), Freeman, Scafidi and Sjoquist (2002, Tables 10-12), Lankford, Loeb and
Wyckoff (2002, Tables 10 and 11), Reed and Rueben (2002).  Sieber’s (1982, p. 42) study of classroom assignments
in a New York City elementary school reports that teachers normally “viewed as a rewarding and prestigious task”
the assignment to classes with advanced students.
9 Empirical studies confirm that household residential demand is influenced by perceived school quality and
by such school characteristics as racial composition (Bogart and Cromwell 2000).
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correlated with unobserved, and hence omitted, factors related to student and teacher ability or to
other factors that positively influence achievement, such as parental involvement.  A similar
problem arises in models that use teacher fixed effects.
7
The first such process, which we call across-school sorting, has to do with how teachers
and students choose, or are assigned, to schools.  As numerous empirical studies have shown,
teachers’ preferences  among districts are influenced by factors such as salary levels and student
characteristics, and among schools within districts by the characteristics of the students, with the
more qualified teachers often showing both the inclination and ability to transfer to schools with
more advantaged students.
8  At the same time that teachers are making decisions about where to
teach, parents are also making decisions that affect how students are distributed across schools.
Many of these  parental decisions involve the choice of where to live, as in the  well-known
Tiebout (1956) model.
9  But in some cases, such as in districts permitting some form of school
choice, parents may be able to choose among schools without having to move.
The second major process driving the matching of teachers with students, within-school
sorting, has received much less attention in economic models.  Parents often form opinions10 See Clotfelter, Ladd and Vigdor (2004) for a discussion of theoretical rationales for positive matching.
11 Negative matching might be predicted by a Lazear (2001)-style model of an aggregate achievement-
maximizing administrator, in the event that the returns to teacher quality are highest for low-performing students. 
Evidence presented below suggest that this condition does not hold, at least for the measure of achievement utilized
by North Carolina public schools.
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regarding which of the available teachers in a school they would most prefer to teach their
children; some act on these preferences by trying to influence administrative decisions regarding
who will teach their child (Hollingshead 1949; Sieber 1982; Lareau 1987 and 2000; Oakes 1995). 
Although many principals appear to resist such efforts, this kind of “teacher shopping” often
seems to be successful (Hui, 2003).  Teachers themselves may be an additional source of within-
school sorting.  Experienced teachers, for example, may  successfully resist being assigned less
able students.
If these two processes result in the matching of more able students to teachers with
stronger qualifications, a state we refer to as positive matching, coefficients on these
qualifications will be biased upward.  Available evidence indicates that positive matching of
teachers and students is the empirical norm (Rivkin, Hanushek and Kain, 2005; Betts, Zau and
Rice 2003; Clotfelter, Ladd and Vigdor 2004).
10  The alternative condition – negative matching –
would occur if teachers with stronger qualifications were assigned to classes with the less able
students.
11  In such a scenario, coefficients on teacher qualifications would be biased downwards.
3. North Carolina data 
The data we use for this study are derived from administrative records maintained by the12 While these data are not available to the general public, researchers affiliated with academic institutions
can apply to the NCERDC, located at Duke University, for access.
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North Carolina Education Research Data Center (NCERDC).
12  North Carolina is an appropriate
state for this analysis for several reasons. Because it has a statewide course of study, its tests are
closely aligned with what students are expected to know and be able to do. Hence, test scores are
likely to measure more fully what teachers have taught than in many other states.  The state is
relatively large and exhibits substantial variation across its 117 school districts with respect to the
racial and socio-economic mix of the students and student performance.  Although teachers’
associations in North Carolina have no collective bargaining power, cross-district variation in
salary schedules, and variation in working conditions across schools, create incentives for
teachers to sort in nonrandom ways. Finally, we note that the state boasts a stable and relatively
sophisticated performance-based accountability system which could potentially exacerbate the
incentives for positive matching (Clotfelter, Ladd, Vigdor, and Aliaga Diaz 2004).
 We link several different sets of records to form the database used for this analysis. 
Student information, including race, gender, participation in the federal free and reduced price
lunch subsidy program, and standardized test scores are derived from student test records.  In
addition to these variables, which are available in many administrative data sets, responses to a
number of supplemental survey questions, including information on parental education, students’
computer use, hours spent watching television, and hours spent reading for leisure at home, as
well as a measure of time spent on homework are also available.  Each student test score record
identifies the name of the teacher who administered the test.  In elementary schools, the teacher13 To verify that a teacher listed as administering a test to students in grade i in school j, was actually a
classroom teacher in grade i in school j, we cross-referenced a separate North Carolina administrative dataset, the
School Activity Report, which records the identity and assignment of each teacher in each school.  This cross-
reference eliminates teachers who taught non-core subjects in school j (e.g. music, physical education), those who
started positions at the school midyear, and those who had no regular position at the school.  Student test score
records associated with an “eliminated” teacher are excluded from our analysis.  Moreover, since we focus on
schools with more than one classroom per grade in order to exploit within-school variation in teacher characteristics,
students with a valid teacher but in a school with no other valid teachers were also excluded from the sample.
14From the early 1960s through the mid-1990s, all elementary school teachers were required to take either
the Elementary Education or the Early Childhood Education test. Starting in the mid-1990s, teachers were required
to take both an Elemenatary Education Curriculum and an Elementary Education Content test. We normalized test
scores on each of these tests separately for each year the test was administered based on means and standard
deviations from test scores for all teachers in our data set, not just those in our 2001 subset of 5
th grade teachers.  
For teachers with multiple test scores in their personnel file, our teacher test score variable equals the average of all 
scores for which we can perform this normalization.  While in principle it would be interesting to enter licensure test
scores separately, rather than as a composite, the potential for endogenous choice of test taken on the part of teachers
would complicate any such analysis.
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administering the test is most likely a student’s regular classroom teacher.
13 By confining our
attention to 5
th grade students, we are thus able to link the test score database to information on
teacher qualifications. As far as we know, North Carolina provides the only state-wide data set
that permits the matching of teachers to students at the classroom level. 
The teacher data come from a state-maintained archive of personnel records.  For each
teacher, information is available on licensure test scores, including the type of test taken and the
year it was administrated; undergraduate institution attended, whether the teacher has any
advanced degrees or is National Board Certified, and the number of years of teaching experience. 
We formed a standardized licensure test score variable for each teacher by converting test scores
from different test administrations in North Carolina to standardized scores using the means and
standard deviations for tests taken in each year by all teachers in our data set.
14  The years of
experience variable is the one used by the state to determine a teacher’s salary, and generally
counts all years of teaching whether in the State of North Carolina, or elsewhere, for which the15 The teacher experience variable was missing for some teachers.  In cases where it was possible to observe
experience levels in payroll records from other years, we imputed values.  In cases where observations from other
years’ payroll data were inconsistent with the 2000/01 record., we put more weight on the more recent record. .
16 Reflecting differences in alternative employment opportunities by teaching field, Murnane and Olsen
(1989) show that the length of first spell in teaching varied significantly by teaching area. 
17 The categories were derived from information from Barron’s College Admissions Selector for 1988,
based on information for first-year students in each university in 1986-87. Our category of very competitive includes
universities rated as most competitive, highly competitive or very competitive; competitive are those rated as
competitive; less competitive are those rated as less competitive or non competitive; and the unranked category
includes special programs such as art schools, international universities or universities for which we were not able to
find a rating.  Barron’s uses criteria such as the median entrance examination scores, percentages of students scoring
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state has given the teacher credit.
15  Basic demographic information on each teacher, including
race and gender, are also available. 
Table 1a  presents basic summary statistics describing the 5
th grade teachers working in
North Carolina during the 2000/01 school year, for both the full sample and also the evenly
balanced school subsample, to which we will return in section 5 below.  The vast majority of the
3,842 individuals matching our definition of a 5
th grade teacher were female and white. The
median teacher had between six and twelve years of prior experience and fewer than one in ten
had no prior experience.  The proportion of teachers with licensure test scores within one
standard deviation of the mean is slightly more than would be expected with a purely normal
distribution (73 percent rather than 68 percent), and the teachers with test scores outside this
interval are disproportionately drawn from the lower tail of the distribution.  Provided outside
opportunities are positively correlated with teacher test scores, this distribution is consistent with
a positive correlation between the probability of departure and access to non-teaching
opportunities.
16  Most teachers graduate from colleges ranked by Barron’s as being competitive,
and more teachers are drawn from the schools at the low end of the college quality spectrum than
from the high end.
17  This pattern reflects the fact that the largest teacher education programs in500 and above and 600 and above on both the math and verbal parts of the SAT or comparable scores for the ACT,
percentage of students who ranked in the upper fifth or two-fifths of their high school class, and the percentage of
applicants who were accepted. If information for a university was missing for 1988, we substituted the ranking for
the 1979 or 1999 Selector, with the choice varying with the era in which the teacher attended college.   
18 The information on parental education is based on teacher reports at the time the students are tested.
Instead of using the reports of current teachers, we use those of each student’s teacher in the prior year. We use these
prior year estimates to minimize any bias in our subsequent analyses of the effects of the qualifications of fifth grade
teachers on student achievement that could arise from any systematic under or overreporting of parental education
correlated with the characteristics of the fifth grade teachers.
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North Carolina are, by state policy, located in the state colleges, which are relatively unselective.
Although North Carolina boasts the largest number of National Board Certified teachers in the
country, they account for less than 4 percent of the state’s fifth grade teachers.
The characteristics of North Carolina’s 2000/01 cohort of public school 5
th grade students
are summarized in Table 1b.  Once again, we focus here on the characteristics of the full sample 
and postpone the discussion of the evenly balanced school subsample to  Section 5.  Students are
more racially diverse than their teachers, and the proportion of black students significantly
exceeds the national average.  The median student has parents with a high school diploma but no
postsecondary degrees, watches between two and three hours of television per day, only rarely
uses a personal computer at home, spends 30 minutes per day reading for pleasure, and spends
one to three hours on homework per day.
18  Nearly four students in nine are eligible for
subsidized lunch; and substantial numbers are rated as exceptional, whether gifted or
handicapped. Relatively few students are either repeating the 5
th grade or have limited English
proficiency.
4. Evidence of across- and within-school sorting 
As discussed above, in the absence of purposeful intervention on the part of19Using F-tests, we were able to reject the hypothesis of equality of student characteristics across teacher
qualification categories except in the cell relating teacher experience to percent of students with parents who are
college graduates, and in the four cells relating National Board Certification to student characteristics.
20 In this and subsequent analysis, we restrict our attention to schools with more than one classroom per
grade.  The mean for each school characteristic in the first three columns is one and in  the fourth column is zero.   
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administrators or other officials, theory and previous empirical research suggest that teachers
with better credentials will gravitate towards schools with more advantaged students.  Table 2
provides evidence of across-school sorting in North Carolina 5
th grade classrooms.  The rows of
the table categorize teachers in five ways, and the columns refer to average characteristics of
students at the school level. The table entries are means of these averages, weighted by the
number of teachers having the specified qualifications. In all cases higher entries for school
characteristics represent higher proportions of more advantaged or higher performing students.
Consistent with the hypothesis of positive matching, the table shows that, by most
measures, teachers with better qualifications typically work in schools serving higher proportions
of advantaged students.
19  Teachers with more experience, degrees from more highly ranked
colleges, higher licensure test scores, or advanced degrees are more likely to be found in schools
with higher proportions of students who are white, not receiving subsidized lunches, have college
educated parents and who scored well on the prior year test. The only non-monotonic patterns
appear in the relationships between teacher experience and parent education, and between college
rank and percent nonwhite. Nonetheless, the general pattern is clear.
 Measures of within-school sorting are shown in Table 3. The rows display the same set
of teacher qualifications as those shown in Table 2 and the columns refer to the same student
characteristics.  The entries, however, now refer to the average characteristics of students at the
classroom level relative to the school-wide average.
20  The clearest patterns emerge for the21 We used the prior year teacher’s report in order to break any potential relationship between the errors in
the current teacher’s estimates of parental education levels and the particular students she teachers.
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teachers with the lowest licensure test scores and the teachers who are National Board Certified.
Teachers with the lowest test scores tend to teach in classrooms that have below-average
percentages of white students and of students with college-educated parents, and they teach
students with less average ability as measured their prior year test scores than those in other
classrooms.   In contrast, teachers who are National Board Certified  teach students who are more
affluent, whose parents are more likely to be college graduates, and who are more able than
students in other classrooms.  Further evidence of this positive matching at the classroom level
emerges from the observation that the least experienced teachers tend to teach in classrooms with
below-average proportions of students with college educated parents, and teachers who have
degrees from the least competitive colleges tend to be in classrooms with the least able students. 
Thus, the net effect of within-school sorting is qualitatively quite similar to the effect of across-
school sorting in that it tends to match the most qualified teachers with the most able students.
To investigate the extent of within-school sorting more formally, we conducted a series of
P
2 tests using 1,160 North Carolina elementary schools with at least two 5
th grade classrooms in
2000/01. We conducted up to six tests in each school to examine whether students’ classroom
assignments are statistically independent of a set of six student characteristics: gender, race,
participation in the Federal subsidized school lunch program, whether the student attended the
same school in the previous year, the student’s prior year test score (with categories being above
or below the state average), and the prior year teacher’s report of parental education.
21  The null
hypothesis in each test is that students were assigned randomly across classrooms within the22In these tests, we compare the actual distribution of students in each classroom to the expected
distribution under the hypothesis of even assignment within each grade.  In other words, variation in student
composition across grades within a school does not increase the size of the chi-squared statistic.  Some schools have
data or multiple classrooms only for certain grades; for these schools our tests are based only on the grades with
adequate data.  The previous year test score and previous year attendance tests use only 4
th and 5
th grade data, since
we have no information on test scores or school attendance prior to 3
rd grade.
23 Under the hypothesis of random assignment, and presuming that the six chi-squared tests are
independent, we would expect about 53 percent of schools to fail at least one test, using the 10 percent significance
level. Because the student characteristics are likely to be correlated, however, the chi-squared tests are not likely to
be independent. As a result, we would expect a lower proportion of the schools to fail at least one test.  
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school with respect to the specified characteristic.
To reduce the probability of incorrectly accepting the null hypothesis, we raised the
power of the tests by pooling information on student assignments in the third, fourth, and fifth
grades in each school.
22  We also chose the relatively conservative significance level of 10
percent as the critical value for the tests. Finally, we examine the overall distribution of p-values
for each set of tests to determine whether the schools that we conclude are assigning students
randomly are instead simply presenting insufficient evidence to warrant rejection of the null
hypotheses.  Were this latter possibility the case, we would expect a skewed overall distribution
of p-values.  Under random assignment, the distribution of p-values should be roughly uniform.
As shown in Table 4, in 521 out of the 1,160 schools we failed to reject the null
hypothesis of random assignment for all six of our tests.
23  Figure 1 displays the distribution of p-
values for the parental education test for all the schools in the sample.  The tests for about 6
percent of these schools exhibit p-values less that 1 percent, indicating particularly extreme
departures from a random distribution of students by parental education.  Beyond the 10 percent
level, and particularly beyond the 15 percent level, however, the p-values display a  nearly
uniform distribution, with close to 1 percent of all p-values in each band of width 0.01.  This24 Although it would be interesting to explore the reasons that schools differ in the apparent randomness of
their classroom assignments, observable indicators show little relation with assignment patterns.  Tables 1a and 1b
show that the non-random schools on average have slightly higher shares of black teachers and black, poor, and low-
achieving students, compared to apparently random schools.  Other than these relatively small differences, it is
possible only to speculate that, for one reason or another, principals in the non-random schools are simply more open
to parental suggestions regarding classroom assignments than are principals in the apparently random schools.
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suggests that a relatively small number of schools are responsible for a large share of the
systematic sorting made apparent in Table 3.
 Figures 2 and 3 show the distributions of p-values from the P
2 tests for students by race
and subsidized lunch status.  The near uniform distribution of the p-values for the racial
composition test suggests that only a very small fraction of North Carolina schools systematically
segregate students by race within schools.  At the same time, only a small mass of points emerge
with p-values very close to one, indicating that few if any schools perfectly balance the racial
composition of all classrooms.  That pattern is consistent with prior findings of low racial
segregation across classrooms within elementary schools (Morgan and McPartland 1981 and
Clotfelter, Ladd and Vigdor 2003).  The pattern of p-values is less uniform for the free and
reduced lunch status of students.  This measure of student socioeconomic status is actually the
strongest predictor of separation across classrooms in North Carolina, yet only a small fraction of
schools show evidence of systematic separation by this variable.
24 We return to the sample of
schools that failed none of the six tests in our modeling effort below. 
5. Estimating the effect of teacher qualifications on student achievement
In principle, the best way to determine the effects of teacher qualifications on student
achievement would be to randomly assign teachers with different qualifications to schools and
classrooms and to compare the test scores of students facing teachers with different15
qualifications.  The previous section has documented that the actual distribution of teachers in
North Carolina is far from random across schools, and that at least some schools systematically
assign teachers to classrooms with significantly different characteristics. As a result, the
estimation strategy must be more complex and must explicitly account for the nonrandom
distribution of teachers.  The goal is to approximate the results that would emerge from a truly
random experiment.
Our strategy for estimating the effects on teacher qualifications on student achievement in
the presence of across-school and within-school sorting has three main components. First is the
use of a rich set of student-level control variables that includes both the demographic
characteristics of students and their survey responses about the time they spend watching TV,
reading and doing homework. To the extent these characteristics are correlated with both
achievement and teacher credentials, including them will ameliorate omitted variable bias. 
Second is the addition of school fixed effects. These fixed effects imply that coefficients are
identified on the basis of variation in teacher qualifications across classrooms within each school,
eliminating any bias associated with across-school sorting.  Third, we restrict the sample to the
set of schools that, based on the P
2 tests just discussed, have distributed students across
classrooms in a way that balances observable student characteristics.  Because any bias
associated with nonrandom matching within schools is likely to be most severe in schools that
show evidence of a departure from even balancing, restricting the sample in this way will reduce
if not eliminate it.
As a benchmark for analyzing the impact of sorting on estimates of teacher credential
effects, the first two columns of Table 5 present a very simple descriptive specification. Fifth16
grade math and reading test scores, standardized in each regression to have mean zero and
standard deviation one, are estimated as a function solely of teacher characteristics, as well as
class size. The absence of control variables means that the estimated effects should be interpreted
as associations, not as causal relationships.  
The table indicates that many teacher characteristics, including both demographic
characteristics and qualifications, exhibit strong and statistically significant partial correlations
with student achievement.  Relative to white teachers (the omitted racial category) black teachers
and teachers of other races teach students with significantly lower test scores. Similarly, relative
to female teachers, male teachers teach students with lower math and reading scores. The
relationship between student achievement and teacher experience is nonlinear, with the peak
occurring in those classrooms with teachers having between 13 and 26 years of experience;
novice teachers (the omitted base category) are associated with the lowest test scores.  Teachers
with degrees from less competitive institutions teach students with significantly lower test scores,
and teachers with advanced degrees show a slight but insignificant tendency to teach students
with higher test scores.  Higher licensure test scores are associated with higher-test scores. 
Finally, class size is a significant positive predictor of test scores, which could reflect efforts on
the part of school administrators to put low-performing students in smaller classes as in Lazear
(2001).
The other four regressions in Table 5 reflect the addition of student-level covariates to the
basic specification.  The third and fourth regressions include controls for student gender, race,
subsidized lunch receipt, parental education, time spent watching television, reading for pleasure,25 Because time spent on homework may be endogenously determined by teacher behavior, we have also
estimated models that exclude the homework variables.  The results are similar except that the estimated effects of
teacher experience are all somewhat larger than in equations that omit the behavioral variables. Coefficients on
student characteristics, derived from the regressions reported in Table 6, appear as Appendix Table A1.  Student
characteristic coefficients derived from other specifications are available from the authors upon request. 
Our sample size declines by roughly 7,000 students in each regression that adds student covariates, owing
primarily to missing data on subsidized lunch receipt.  Results estimated on a constant set of students across
specifications yield qualitatively identical results.
26 It is worth noting that the addition of student covariates has much the same effect in models with school
fixed effects: the model without student covariates exhibits consistently larger estimated teacher effects.  The
implication is that positive matching within schools is at work, thus imbuing estimated teacher characteristics with
unwarranted impact, owing to omitted variable bias.
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using a computer, and doing homework, but not for the student’s prior year test score.
25  The
addition of these control variables alters the coefficients of the teacher characteristics in ways
that are consistent with the phenomenon of  positive matching.  The difference between black
and white teachers is greatly reduced, and the negative coefficient on teachers of “other race” has
been reduced in the equation for reading and reversed in sign for math. The estimated impact of
male teachers on reading scores is reduced by two thirds in reading and is indistinguishable from
zero for math. The coefficients on the teacher experience variables continue to be largely
significant, and the peak continues to occur among highly experienced teachers, but the
magnitude of the relationships have  declined appreciably.  Teachers graduating from less
competitive colleges continue to be associated with lower-performance in reading, and those with
lower licensure test scores are associated with lower scores in both areas, but the magnitudes of
these effects decline as well.  Point estimates of class size effects continue to be positive, but the
magnitudes are at most one-fifth the level of the initial estimates.
26
The final pair of regressions in Table 5 adds a single control variable for each student: the
student’s 4
th grade test score.  As we noted earlier, lagged test scores are usually included in
achievement models to account for the cumulative nature of the education process.  When error27The sign of this correlation is unclear a priori.  On the one hand, unobserved but relatively permanent
characteristics would generate positive serial correlation.  On the other hand, because standardized tests are noisy
signals of ability, some mean reversion is likely to occur which would generate negative serial correlation.  Thus,
while failure to control for lagged achievement will be expected to generate biased coefficients under any but the
most unusual circumstances (namely, when achievement is affected only by contemporaneous school and non-school
factors), the inclusion of a lagged achievement variable may introduce bias of its own. 
28As with tests of over identifying restrictions in instrumental variable estimation, this check focuses on a
necessary but not sufficient condition. (Hausman, 1978).
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terms are serially correlated, however, the inclusion of a lagged dependent variable can lead to
biased and inconsistent coefficient estimates, with the sign and magnitude of the bias depending
on the direction of serial correlation.
27
Given certain conditions, however, estimates of the effects of teacher qualifications on
student achievement will be unbiased under either specification.  The conditions are that the
teacher qualifications be uncorrelated with both past values of observable characteristics and the
error term, conditional on other observed variables.  These conditions would be clearly met if
teachers were randomly assigned to students.  In such a scenario, teacher credentials are
uncorrelated with observed and unobserved student characteristics, both past and present.  An
empirical test for whether our regression estimates mirror those that would be obtained from a
random assignment trial, then, is whether the estimated coefficients are sensitive to the inclusion
of a lagged dependent variable.
28 
Comparing the final two columns of Table 5 with the previous two indicates significant
differences between models that do or do not include lagged student test scores and, hence, that
we have not yet estimated unbiased causal effects of teacher characteristics.  For example, the
fact that the addition of the  lagged dependent achievement variable causes the large negative
effect of being a black teacher to disappear provides evidence that the other  control variables are29  There may be some concern that our use of school fixed effects biases estimates of teacher credential
effects downwards.  Such a bias would occur, for example, if school administrators had access to superior
information on teacher quality and hired teachers of uniform quality.  In such a scenario, observed differences in
teacher characteristics across classrooms within a school would be offset by opposite differences in unobserved
components of quality.  While we suspect that such a bias is not likely to be empirically noteworthy, readers with
differing opinions may wish to consider our estimates in Tables 6 and 7 as lower bounds for the true effect of teacher
credentials on student test scores.  The estimates in Table 5 would then serve as upper bounds.
30In spite of this evidence, it would not be appropriate to conclude that the use of school fixed effects
obviates the need for including student-level covariates.  In unreported specifications including school fixed effects
but no student-level covariates, the estimated relationship between most teacher credentials and test scores is more
positive than that reported in Table 6 – indicative of omitted variable bias associated with positive within-school
matching.
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not sufficient to break the correlation between being a black teacher and being assigned to low
performing students. Other differences have similar interpetations.
Fortunately, the unusually detailed character of our data, which makes it possible for us to 
match teachers and students at the classroom level, allows  us to incorporate school fixed effects
into our achievement regressions (see  Table 6). The inclusion of these school  fixed effects
means that the  coefficients of teacher characteristics  in that table  are estimated based only on
the within-school variation in teacher characteristics, thereby eliminating any remaining bias
associated with the nonrandom sorting of teachers and students across schools (but not within
schools).
29
Two clear patterns emerge from Table 6.  First, introducing school fixed effects drives
most of the effects of qualifications down, even relative to the attenuated levels observed in the
final columns of Table 5.
30 Nonetheless many of them remain statistically significant.  Second,
the two sets of estimates of the effects of teacher qualifications – those from the models with and
without the lagged achievement variable – converge.  The high degree of concordance of results
across specifications gives us confidence that we now have obtained relatively unbiased
estimates of the effects of teacher qualifications.31 In a model applying student and school fixed effects estimated for 4
th - 7
th graders Rivkin, Hanushek and
Kain (2005, pp. 444-445) find that novice teachers were associated with math achievement gains of .103 standard
deviations below those for teachers with six or more years of experience; for reading the novice deficit was .045
standard deviations. Rockoff (2004) finds the difference in reading scores between teachers with zero and ten years
to be about .17. Our findings for zero versus 6-12 years of .085 and .064 for math and reading, respectively, are in
this general range.
32 These results may appear to conflict Goldhaber and Anthony (2004), which is generally cited as a study
finding significant positive effects of National Board Certification.  A close reading of that article, however, reveals
that no direct conflict exists.  The Goldhaber and Anthony study finds that teachers who are destined to become
National Board Certified in the future are most effective, and find no significant evidence that teachers who became
certified in the past – the only group flagged in our analysis – are more or less effective than teachers who never
applied for certification.  Goldhaber and Anthony also focus on older North Carolina data, from the late 1990s.
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As displayed in Table 6, statistically significant positive effects on student achievement
emerge for teacher experience (for both math and reading), teacher test scores (most clearly for
math) and National Board Certification (for reading only).  Compared to students assigned to
teachers with no prior experience, students assigned to highly experienced teachers attain
standardized reading and math test scores roughly one-tenth of a standard deviation higher in
math and slightly less than a tenth of a standard deviation in reading.
31  About half of this gain
occurs for the first one or two years of teaching. After that point the experience-test score profile
flattens considerably, with the peak occurring in the 20-27 year category in all four
specifications.  Students assigned to teachers with higher licensure test scores apparently do
better in math, but the effect is relatively modest.  A one-standard-deviation increase in teacher
test score implies at most a 0.017 standard deviation increase in average student math test scores
and a somewhat smaller increase in reading scores.  Students assigned to National Board
Certified teachers score on average 0.030-0.045 standard deviations higher in reading, but no
higher in math.
32
The estimated impact of the quality of the teacher’s college is uniformly small and, in
general is not statistically significant. The most surprising result is the consistently negative33 In analysis not shown here, we find that the more experienced teachers have a far higher probability of
having a master’s degree than do the younger teachers.  Further analysis of the characteristics of teachers who get a
master’s degree would be desirable.  One interpretation of these results is that the financial incentives to get a
master’s degree that are embedded in the single salary schedule represented wasted money except insofar as they
keep some teachers in the profession so that students can benefit from their experience. 
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effect of a master’s degree on student achievement. The coefficients suggest that, all else
constant, teachers with master’s degrees are less effective than those without.
33
In contrast to the teacher qualification variables, the coefficients of the teacher race
variables in Table 6 continue to exhibit substantial variation across the specifications with and
without controls for lagged student achievement. Because fixed effects for schools are included,
the difference in coefficients can only be attributable to nonrandom assignment of teachers across
classrooms within schools. In particular, it appears that black teachers tend to teach the lower
performing math students within schools. Evidence for that conclusion emerges from that fact
that once prior year performance is included in the equations, the coefficient for black teachers is
closer to zero and not statistically significant. 
 Analogously, the fact that the inclusion of the lagged achievement score eliminates the
statistically significant positive effect of class size that appears in columns 1 and 2 suggests that,
consistent with Lazear’s (2001) theoretical prediction, low performing students may be
disproportionately placed in smaller classes within schools.  The absence of class size effects in
columns 3 and 4 does not mean that class size is irrelevant for student achievement.  Instead it
simply means that once we use school fixed effects to focus on differences within a school, we
do not observe sufficient variation in class sizes to estimate an effect.  This methodology is thus
far better suited to measuring the effects of teachers, which do indeed vary quite significantly34 By way of comparison, we estimated a school fixed effects model comparable to those in Table 6 using
gains in achievement rather than the lagged dependent form.  Except for differences in the first experience term (a
larger effect for math and a smaller one for reading) and a large and significant positive effect for other race teachers,
the estimated effects in the achievement gain model were generally close to those in the lagged achievement model.
35 Selection along most of the student-level characteristics used in our chi-squared tests is not an issue in
many of our earlier estimates, since we control for most of those characteristics directly.  Rather, our goal here is to
identify schools that are less likely to select on unobservables across classrooms.
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within schools, than to measuring class size effects.
34   
Although we have a good bit of confidence in the estimated effects of teacher credentials 
that emerge from Table 6, these equations still might not fully address the bias that arises from
within-school sorting. To address that source of bias, we restrict the sample to the schools in
which students were assigned to classrooms in a balanced manner, namely the schools that failed
none of the six P
2 tests for random assignment of students.  While it is still possible for there to
be some form of nonrandom selection into classrooms in these schools, any such selection would
have to be along a dimension uncorrelated with any of the six characteristics used in our tests.
35 
If nothing else, the probability of selection on unobservables should be significantly lower in
schools that do not also feature selection on unobservables.
Tables 1a and 1b compare summary statistics for the overall sample and this evenly
balanced school subsample, which includes  roughly 40 percent of the full set of students.  In
general, the characteristics of teachers and students in the balanced school subsample are quite
similar to those in the full sample.  With respect to the characteristics of teachers, only the racial
characteristics differ between the two samples, with the share of white teachers in the balanced
school subsample being about 2 percentage points  higher than the share in the full sample (Table
1a).
With respect to the two sets of students, a larger number of  statistically significant36 See footnote 31, above, for a discussion of estimates found in existing literature.
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differences emerge, as shown in Table 1b.  The students in the balanced school subsample are on
average somewhat more advantaged, in the sense of being more white and have higher prior year
test scores and parents with more education than those in the full sample.  Still,  the differences
between the two samples are generally quite small in magnitude.
Table 7 shows the results of regression specifications identical to those in Table 6,
including school fixed effects and student-level covariates, estimated on the balanced school
subsample.  Although the smaller sample generates somewhat larger standard errors and hence
coefficients that are somewhat less precisely estimated, the patterns and estimated coefficients
are quite similar to those obtained with the full sample.  These findings provide added support
for our previous conclusions about the effects of teacher credentials.  The factors associated with
higher student test scores in the full sample, namely teacher experience and teacher licensure test
scores, continue to be significant predictors of achievement, with estimated magnitudes that are
similar across the two samples. As with the full sample, the difference in test scores between
students with novice teachers and those highly experienced teachers is roughly one-tenth of a
standard deviation, with a large portion of these returns to experience occurring  within the first
few years of teaching.  These experience effects are in the range of those found in other studies
employing similar data, but smaller than the largest estimates.
36 In addition, a one-standard
deviation increase in a teacher’s licensure test score now predicts a 0.012 standard deviation in
student achievement in math.
In both Tables 6 and 7, coefficients exhibit a tendency to be higher when controls for
lagged test scores are introduced as explanatory variables.  In Table 7, the higher coefficients are37 To provide further evidence along these lines, we estimated models analogous to those in Table 7 for the
set of schools that failed one or more tests for random assignment – that is, the set of schools excluded from Table 7. 
These estimates are shown in Appendix Table A2. Comparing specifications with and without lagged achievement
test scores reveals substantial evidence of bias associated with positive matching in this sample.  The majority of
teacher experience coefficients, for example, decline upon introduction of the lagged dependent variable.
We also estimated identical specifications using the set of schools where we uniformly failed to reject the
null hypothesis of random assignment using the 20% significance level. Whereas the original 10% criterion produced
a sample about 40% as large as the full sample, the 20% criterion yielded one slightly smaller than one fourth the
original size.  Results, shown in Appendix Table A3, show the same pattern of increasing upon introduction of
lagged achievement controls shown in Table 7.  The typical coefficient increase is smaller, however, suggesting that
further increases in stringency would produce more complete convergence of coefficients across specifications.
Finally, we note that coefficient magnitudes on teacher experience are similar across all specifications,
lending greater confidence to the conclusion that any bias remaining in estimated specifications must be small.
38 The answer to this question is also sensitive to the measurement of student achievement scores.  Indeed,
by testing for nonlinear effects on achievement we are assuming that we have identified a valid measure of
achievement and are measuring it linearly.  Nonlinear but monotonic transformations of our achievement test scores
may be equally valid measures of achievement but may also yield very different conclusions regarding the existence
of nonlinear effects.  We proceed with this exercise under the presumption that the scale of our achievement measure
is an important one for policy purposes – it is used by the State of North Carolina for the purpose of gauging
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somewhat troubling as they suggests that lagged test scores are correlated with teacher
characteristics even in schools that appear to be evenly balanced.  Note, however, that the fact
that the coefficients are larger rules out the possibility of positive matching in evenly balanced
schools. Instead they suggest that  teachers with better credentials in these schoools are being
assigned to less able students.   If anything, then, the coefficients we report here are biased
towards zero – the opposite of the typical concern in studies of this nature.
37
6. Differential effects by type of student
How teachers are distributed among schools and across classrooms within schools
relative to students clearly affects the distribution of student achievement. One final question is
whether it also affects the average level of achievement. The answer to this question hinges on
the existence of nonlinearities in the relationship between teacher characteristics and student
achievement.
38  To this point, our regression estimates have maintained the assumption that theprogress in schools, and applying positive and negative sanctions to schools and their staff (Clotfelter, Ladd, Vigdor
and Aliaga Diaz 2004).
39 In addition to these specifications, we estimated models interacting student race (nonwhite vs. white) with
teacher characteristics.  None of the interaction coefficients in these models was statistically significant. In the
current study we do not examine the related question of whether students learn at higher rates when matched to a
teacher of the same race or gender, an issue that has been examined by Dee (2005).
40 Since Tables 7 and 8 both use the evenly balanced school subsample, comparison of the interaction terms
in Table 8 with the corresponding main effects in Table 7 provides some insight as to the impact of teacher
characteristics on the omitted group.  For example, the two significant positive coefficients on teacher
experience/non-subsidized lunch student in Table 8 are smaller than the corresponding main effects in Table 7,
indicating that the net impact of teacher experience on subsidized lunch students is still positive.  Complete results of
Table 8 are given in Appendix Table A4. 
41This table shows several significant coefficients associated with teachers from unranked colleges.  As
Table 1a shows, roughly 1 percent of evenly balanced school subsample teachers fall into this category.  Thus, this
result quite likely reflects the impact of a very small number of influential observations.
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effects of teacher qualifications do not vary systematically across types of students.  Table 8
summarizes the results of regression specifications that relax this assumption by interacting the
full set of teacher characteristics with particular student characteristics, including subsidized
lunch receipt, parent education, and prior year achievement.
39  The regressions are estimated on
the sample of North Carolina elementary schools with evenly balanced classroom assignment
patterns, using covariates identical to those employed in Table 7.  The student characteristics are
all defined as 0-1 variables in which 1 denotes greater advantage or ability.  The table reports
coefficients and standard errors only for the interaction terms.
40 
The first column in Table 8 reveals evidence that math score returns to teacher experience
are significantly larger for students not receiving subsidized lunches – that is, for the more
affluent students.  All six interaction terms related to teacher experience are positive.  The two
largest interaction terms, identifying the differential impact of teachers with at least 20 years’
experience on students not receiving subsidized lunch, are statistically significant at the 10 and 5
percent level, respectively.
4142Among the other results, it appears that Hispanic teachers have a comparative advantage in educating
lower-performing students.  Since the evenly balanced school subsample contains only a handful of Hispanic
teachers (see Table 1a), these results should be interpreted with extreme caution.
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The second column, which replaces math with reading test scores as a dependent variable
but otherwise replicates the first specification, shows no statistically significant interaction terms. 
This general pattern of  significant interaction terms for math but not reading  is replicated in the
third and fourth columns, where we interact teacher characteristics with a dichotomous variable
measuring parental education. More experienced teachers have a significantly more positive
impact on the math test scores of students with more educated parents: all six interaction terms
are positive, and three are significant at the 10 percent level or above.  Children of highly
educated parents also tend to have relatively higher math test scores when assigned to teachers
who are neither black nor “other race,” and who attended unranked colleges.
The final set of specifications interacts a dichotomous measure of prior achievement,
based on students’ 4
th grade test scores, with teacher characteristics.  Although all six experience
interactions are once again positive in the math specification, none is statistically significant.
42 
To the extent that these results indicate that teachers with stronger credentials are more
effective in raising the achievement of the more advantaged students, they have two important
implications.  First, reallocating teachers to students in a manner that offsets the pattern of
positive matching  described in Section 4 above would have the likely effect of reducing mean
achievement scores, at least for math and as measured on the scale used in North Carolina. 
However,  the normative implications of this finding are unclear, for at least three reasons: we do
not know how units of test scores correspond to actual skill accumulation at various points along
the skill distribution; we do not know how fifth grade achievement affects lifetime skill43 It is worth noting that some school accountability programs, including for example the federal No Child
Left Behind Act, with its attention to the academic progress of subgroups within each school, could conceivably
provide a counterweight by inducing administrators to pay closer attention to the achievement of less advantaged
children.
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accumulation; and we lack the broader measure of social welfare that would allow us to value
skill enhancements.  Thus any compelling welfare assessment is obviously well beyond the scope
of this paper.
The second implication follows from the first: particularly in a regime that attaches
incentives to the mean level of achievement within a school, school administrators may well
consider positive matching to be consistent with their own objectives. Thus, the fact that we
observe positive matching in equilibrium can be attributed to four forces: the desire of  teachers
to find more amenable working conditions, the desire of parents to maximize the quality of their
children’s education, the desire of administrators to please potentially vocal parents, and the
desire of administrators to maximize mean achievement.  This confluence of objectives may
explain why the alternative pattern of negative matching, which would be expected in a regime




The tendencies for teachers to seek out more congenial working environments and for
parents to seek out desirable schools and teachers for their children are common features of 
public schools as we know them. Together, they usually produce a “positive matching” of
students to teachers, in which affluent or high-achieving students end up in classrooms taught by44  It is unclear whether this return to early teacher experience reflects true gains in teacher quality or
nonrandom attrition by low-quality teachers.  See Rockoff (2004) for a discussion of this topic.
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better-credentialed teachers.  This positive matching has the effect of confounding efforts to
estimate the relationship between teacher characteristics and student achievement.  To our
knowledge, no previous studies have identified and measured both of these sources of positive
matching.  Our results indicate that the positive correlations between the strength of teacher
qualifications and student achievement observed in cross-sectional data are driven largely by
sorting of teachers and students across schools and, to a lesser extent, within schools.  
This paper illustrates, however, how detailed administrative data can be used to help
disentangle omitted variable bias from true causal effects. Such data allow one to control for a
rich set of covariates including school fixed effects, and to restrict the analysis to schools that
feature a relatively balanced distribution of student observable characteristics across classrooms. 
Results suggest that the within-school matching is relatively minor in North Carolina, implying
that specifications with school fixed effects ameliorate most concerns regarding selection bias.  
We also find that the only teacher qualifications that consistently predict improved
student performance are experience and licensure test scores.  For the typical student, the benefit
from having a highly experienced teacher is approximately one-tenth of a standard deviation on
reading and math test scores. and roughly half of this return occurs for the first one or two years
of teaching experience.
44  With respect to teacher licensure scores, a one-standard-deviation
increase in scores increases predicted student achievement in math by 1 to 2 percent of a standard
deviation.  These results suggest that achievement-maximizing school administrators operating in
a competitive teacher labor market would clearly reward experience, as is the current norm. 29
Rewarding other characteristics, such as advanced degrees and National Board Certification,
would be productive only if such rewards create indirect impacts, such as by inducing teachers to
remain in the profession.
Using our subsample of evenly balanced schools, we find suggestive evidence that returns
to teacher experience in the form of higher student test scores are consistently larger in math,
although not in reading, for the more socioeconomically advantaged and more able students. 
This pattern supports the view that positive teacher-student matching increases the average level
of student achievement in math and may help explain why school administrators have not been
more vigorous in counteracting the positive matching that results from sorting.
It is worth reiterating that this conclusion about the trade-offs in the allocation of teachers
to students with differing characteristics says nothing about the  social valuation of those
tradeoffs.  Though it  appears that efforts to offset the positive matching of  teachers and students
would reduce overall mean achievement in math as measured by test scores, the implications for
social policy depend on at least two additional factors.  First, the existence of complementarities
in skill formation over a student’s school career could militate in the direction of more
investment for disadvantaged students, as suggested by Cunha, Heckman, Lochner and Masterov
(2005).  Second, because the ultimate outcomes of social interest are not test scores but rather a
broader set of life chances it may well be appropriate to attach greater weight to achievement
gains at the low end of the distribution.  Thus, any social valuation of the trade-offs involved
with positive matching require further debate and discussion by social scientists and policy
makers.30
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Table 1a: Summary Statistics for 5





Percent female 90.32 91.30
Percent white 84.64 86.48
**
Percent black 14.24 12.43
**
Percent Hispanic 0.22 0.31
Percent with:
     0 years experience 7.38 7.46
     1-2 years experience 13.34 13.52
     3-5 years experience 15.02 14.30
     6-12 years experience 21.84 22.84
     13-20 years experience 16.29 16.47
     20-27 years experience 17.00 15.77
     More than 27 years experience 9.12 9.63
Percent with licensure test scores:
     1 std. dev. or more below mean 17.84 16.86
     Within 1 std. dev. of mean 72.54 73.82
     1 std. dev. or more above mean 9.62 9.32
Percent graduating from college:
     Ranked as very competitive 9.22 9.17
     Ranked as competitive 53.74 55.17
     Ranked as less competitive 36.18 34.65
     Not ranked by Barron’s 0.87 1.01
Percent National Board Certified 3.35 3.26
Percent with advanced degree 23.67 23.85
** denotes a statistic that differs between the evenly balanced school subsample and residual set
of North Carolina elementary schools at the 5% significance level.35
Table 1b. Summary Statistics for 5
th grade students in North Carolina (N=60,791)
Full sample
(N=60,791)
Evenly balanced school subsample
(N=24,824)
Percent female 49.88 49.67
Percent white 62.51 65.46
**
Percent black 29.93 27.25
** 
Percent Hispanic 3.19 3.26
Percent free/reduced price lunch 41.91 40.19
** 
Percent labeled as gifted 16.56 16.83
Percent labeled as handicapped 10.66 10.90
Percent limited English proficient 1.22 1.33
** 
Percent with 4
th grade test score
    1 std. dev. or more below mean  16.07 15.14
** 
    Within 1 std. dev. of mean 67.10 66.93
    1 std. dev. or more above mean 16.83 17.93
** 
Percent who have repeated a grade 1.08 1.12
Percent with parental education:
    No high school diploma 10.24 11.15
** 
    High school diploma only 51.04 48.45
** 
    Some post secondary 13.75 14.12
** 
    College graduate  25.00 26.28
** 
Percent reporting homework time:
   None 1.57 1.53
   Less than 1 hour per week 25.72 24.98
** 
   1-3 hours per week 39.65 40.15
** 
   3-5 hours per week 16.85 17.08
   5-10 hours per week 13.11 13.07
   More than 10 hours per week 3.10 3.19
Percent reporting home PC use:  
    Almost every day 5.03 5.05
    Once or twice a week 11.67 11.56
    Once or twice a month 17.27 17.18
    Hardly ever 29.35 29.64
    Never 18.70 18.80
    No computer at home 17.98 17.77
Percent reporting reading:
   No free time spent reading 6.20 6.05
   30 minutes per day 45.87 44.95
** 
   1 hour per day 25.17 26.17
** 
   1-2 hours per day 15.24 15.32
   More than 2 hours per day 7.52 7.50
Percent reporting TV use
    None 4.84 4.89
    Less than 1 hour per day 28.48 29.23
** 
    2 hours per day 25.84 25.98
    3 hours per day 18.64 18.78
    4-5 hours per day 12.94 12.62
*
    6 hours or more per day   9.26 8.49
** 
** (
*) denotes a statistic that differs between the evenly balanced school subsample and residual set of North
Carolina elementary schools at the 5% (10%) significance level.3637
Table 2. Evidence of across-school sorting: Characteristics of students taught by the typical
teacher having specified  qualification,  North Carolina schools offering  5
th grade














     0 to 1 year 58.0 51.8 22.9 -0.134
     2 to 5 years 58.2 54.4 23.8 -0.072
     6 or more years 62.8 54.5 23.5 0.000
Barron’s College Rank:
     Less competitive  53.7 49.8 20.3 -0.206
     Competitive 64.4 57.1 24.4 0.118
     Very competitive 59.3 58.2 30.4 0.126
      Not Ranked 58.8 53.5 24.9 -0.047
Licensure test score:
     Z-score < -1 51.2 46.4 18.2 -0.306
     -1 < Z-score < 1 62.9 56.0 24.3 0.054
     Z-score > 1 66.2 58.4 26.8 0.158
Nat’l Board Certification
     No 61.0 54.4 23.4 0.000
     Yes 65.0 57.6 23.8 -0.002
Advanced Degree
     No 60.0 53.5 22.9 -0.043
     Yes 64.9 57.8 25.2 13.8
Overall mean 61.1 54.5 23.5 0.000
Note: For teachers with a given qualification, table entries are averages of school-wide figures
computed over those schools with at least one such teacher.  Using F-tests, the hypothesis that 
student characteristics are equal  across teacher qualification categories is rejected in all but 
the following cases: teacher experience and percent of students with parents who are college
graduates; teacher National Board Certification and all four student characteristics.38
Table 3: Evidence of within-school sorting: classroom characteristics for teachers with varying
















     0 to 1 year 0.99 0.97  0.94* -0.050
     2 to 5 years 1.01 1.00 1.00 0.004
     6 or more years 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.009
Barron’s College Rank:
     Less competitive 1.00 1.00 0.98 -0.052
*
     Competitive 0.99 0.99 1.00 0.017
     Very competitive 1.04 1.00 1.07 0.052
*
     Not Ranked 0.97 0.87 1.08 -0.184
Licensure test score:




     -1 < Z-score < 1 1.01 1.01 1.00 0.023
     Z-score > 1 1.01 1.00 1.08 0.075
**
Nat’l Board Certification
     No 1.00 1.00 0.99 -0.006





     No 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.004
     Yes 0.99 0.98 1.00  -0.011
Note: For teachers with a given qualification, table entries in the first three columns are ratios
of classroom characteristics to school-wide averages.  Table entries in the last column are 
mean differences between classroom and school-average test scores.
*** denotes a ratio or mean difference significantly different from one at the 1% level; 
** the 5%
level; 
* the 10% level.39
Table 4:  Summary of Chi-squared tests of random assignment of students across 5
th
classrooms within elementary schools
Number of tests failed  Number of
schools
Percent of schools
0 of 6  521 44.9
1 of 6  326 28.1
2 of 6  163 14.1
3 of 6   75  6.5
4 of 6 41 3.5
5 of 6  14 1.2 
6 of 6  0 0.0
Total 1,160 100.0
Note: This table reports the results of Chi-squared tests of the null hypothesis that students are
randomly distributed across classrooms within schools along six different observable student
characteristics: race, gender, subsidized lunch receipt, parental education, previous year test
score, and previous year school attendance.  The tests are based on data on the composition of
classes  for up to three grades in each school; significance is based on the 10 percent level.  
See text for further details.40
Table 5: Basic estimates of teacher qualification  effects, with and without student controls
Independent Variable
No student covariates Including student covariates
Omitting lagged achievement Including lagged achievement































































Teacher experience (base=0 years)




























































































































































































































Student covariates No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Lagged student
achievement controls
No No No No Yes Yes
Observations 68,421 68,071 61,509 61,242 60,656 60,502
R
2 0.027 0.026 0.484 0.449 0.724 0.687




significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels.  Demographic controls include gender, race, and free/reduced price lunch
status. Extended set of controls includes categorical measures of computer use, time spent free reading, time spent
watching TV, parental education, and time spent on homework.  Coefficients on extended student controls are
presented in Appendix table A1.41
Table 6. Effects of teacher qualifications, with school fixed effects, full sample
Independent Variable
Omitting lagged achievement Including lagged achievement





































Teacher experience (base=0 years)













































































































































Student covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes
School fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Lagged student achievement controls No No Yes Yes
Observations 61,509 61,242 60,656 60,502
R
2 0.538 0.486 0.756 0.707




significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels.  Demographic controls include gender, race, and free/reduced price
lunch status.  Extended set of controls includes categorical measures of computer use, time spent free reading, time
spent watching TV, parental education, and time spent on homework.42
Table 7 Effects of teacher qualifications, with school fixed effects; evenly balanced school subsample
Omitting lagged achievement Including lagged achievement

































Teacher experience (base=0 years)









































































































Student covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes
School fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Lagged student achievement controls No No Yes Yes
Observations 25,147 25,045 24,768 24,711
R
2 0.553 0.496 0.766 0.708
Note: standard errors, in square brackets, have been corrected for within-classroom clustering. *, **, and *** denote
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels.  Demographic controls include gender, race, and free/reduced price
lunch status.  Extended set of controls includes categorical measures of computer use, time spent free reading, time
spent watching TV, parental education, and time spent on homework.  Sample is restricted to the 521 elementary
schools for which chi-square tests fail to reject the hypothesis of random assignment along six dimensions: race,
gender, parent education, prior year test score, whether a student attended the same school in the previous year, and
free/reduced price lunch receipt.43
Table 8: Do teacher qualification effects vary across students?
Student characteristics: Free/reduced price




th grade test score:
above average = 1.





















































Teacher experience (base is no experience)














































































Quality of undergraduate institution (Base is less competitive college)  












































































N 24,768 24,711 24,970 24,912 25,147 25.045
R
2 0.766 0.708 0.765 0.707 0.654 0.590
Note: Table entries are coefficients on the interaction terms between the teacher characteristic listed in the first column and the
student characteristic named at the top of each row.  Standard errors, in square brackets, have been corrected for within-classroom
clustering. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels.  Sample is restricted to the 521 elementary schools
for which chi-square tests fail to reject the hypothesis of random assignment along six dimensions: race, gender, parent education,
prior year test score, whether a student attended the same school in the previous year, and free/reduced price lunch receipt.
Regressions also control for all covariates used in Table 7, including school fixed effects and lagged achievement.Figure 1: Distribution of p-values for parent education chi-squared tests45
Figure 2: Distribution of p-values for race chi-squared tests.
 46
Figure 3: Distribution of p-values for subsidized lunch chi-square tests.
 47
Table A1: Coefficients on student-level covariates, Table 6 specifications









































































































Lagged parental education(omitted=no HS diploma)




































Report homework time (omitted=none)




























































Reported home PC use (omitted=almost every day):



























































Reported reading time (omitted=none)











[0.011] Independent Variable Math Reading Math Reading
48



































Reported TV use (omitted=none):










































































Appendix TableA2.  Effects of teacher qualifications, with school fixed effects; schools failing at least one chi-
squared test of random assignment across classrooms
Omitting lagged achievement Including lagged achievement

































Teacher experience (base=0 years)
















































Quality of teacher's college (base=less competitive)
























































Student covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes
School fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Lagged student achievement controls No No Yes Yes
Observations 36,362 36,197 35,888 35,791
R
2 0.528 0.480 0.750 0.70650
Appendix Table A3.  Effects of teacher qualifications, with school fixed effects; schools meeting even balance
criteria when significance level is 20%
Omitting lagged achievement Including lagged achievement

































Teacher experience (base=0 years)
















































Quality of teacher's college (base=less competitive)
























































Student covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes
School fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Lagged student achievement controls No No Yes Yes
Observations 14,668 14,608 14,457 14,424
R
2 0.563 0.500 0.769 0.70951






4th grade test score:
 below vs.above average
Math Reading Math Reading Math Reading
Male 0.065*** -0.044*** 0.066*** -0.043*** 0.072*** -0.035***
[0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.008] [0.009]
Black -0.058*** -0.056*** -0.061*** -0.057*** -0.197*** -0.199***
[0.010] [0.011] [0.009] [0.011] [0.012] [0.013]
Hispanic 0.011 0.016 -0.002 -0.007 -0.028 -0.024
[0.020] [0.022] [0.019] [0.021] [0.025] [0.028]
Other 0.080*** 0.015 0.079*** 0.01 0.077*** 0.009
[0.018] [0.019] [0.018] [0.019] [0.023] [0.023]
Gifted 0.345*** 0.081*** 0.351*** 0.080*** 0.775*** 0.517***
[0.011] [0.011] [0.011] [0.011] [0.013] [0.011]
Handicapped 0.02 -0.171*** 0.02 -0.176*** -0.303*** -0.497***
[0.013] [0.015] [0.012] [0.014] [0.016] [0.020]
Limited English proficient 0.068** -0.167*** 0.066** -0.184*** -0.267*** -0.559***
[0.030] [0.038] [0.030] [0.037] [0.039] [0.048]
Does NOT receive
free/reduced price lunch
0.034*** 0.084*** 0.082*** 0.128***
[0.008] [0.009] [0.010] [0.012]
Repeated grade -0.675*** -0.707*** -0.678*** -0.721*** -0.379*** -0.413***
0.041] [0.045] [0.040] [0.044] [0.039] [0.048]
Lagged parental education(omitted=no HS diploma)
High school diploma only 0.033*** 0.102*** 0.147*** 0.216***
[0.012] [0.014] [0.014] [0.018]
Some post secondary 0.061*** 0.154*** 0.222*** 0.316***
[0.014] [0.017] [0.017] [0.021]
College graduate 0.131*** 0.181*** 0.358*** 0.415***
[0.014] [0.017] [0.017] [0.020]
Report homework time (omitted=none)
Less than 1 hour per week 0.070** 0.068* 0.072** 0.072** 0.230*** 0.236***
[0.029] [0.035] [0.029] [0.035] [0.037] [0.045]
1-3 hours per week 0.118*** 0.098*** 0.119*** 0.102*** 0.311*** 0.297***
[0.028] [0.035] [0.028] [0.035] [0.036] [0.045]
3-5 hours per week 0.173*** 0.095*** 0.175*** 0.099*** 0.385*** 0.317***
[0.029] [0.036] [0.029] [0.035] [0.037] [0.045]
5-10 hours per week 0.186*** 0.094*** 0.189*** 0.096*** 0.405*** 0.318***
[0.030] [0.036] [0.030] [0.036] [0.038] [0.045]
More than 10 hours per week 0.211*** 0.085** 0.212*** 0.089** 0.388*** 0.275***
[0.033] [0.042] [0.033] [0.042] [0.042] [0.052]
Reported home PC use (omitted=almost every day):
Once or twice a week 0.040** 0.085*** 0.041*** 0.086*** 0.102*** 0.143***
[0.016] [0.019] [0.016] [0.020] [0.019] [0.023]
Once or twice a month 0.080*** 0.107*** 0.080*** 0.108*** 0.168*** 0.194***
[0.016] [0.018] [0.016] [0.019] [0.019] [0.022]
Hardly ever 0.064*** 0.105*** 0.063*** 0.106*** 0.135*** 0.174***
[0.015] [0.018] [0.015] [0.018] [0.018] [0.022]
Never 0.034** 0.102*** 0.033** 0.105*** 0.103*** 0.170***
[0.015] [0.019] [0.015] [0.019] [0.019] [0.023]
No computer at home 0.022 0.097*** 0.018 0.092*** 0.062*** 0.134***
[0.015] [0.019] [0.015] [0.019] [0.019] [0.023]52
Reported reading time (omitted=none)
30 minutes per day 0.036** 0.070*** 0.037** 0.070*** 0.078*** 0.112***
[0.014] [0.017] [0.014] [0.017] [0.018] [0.020]
1 hour per day 0.072*** 0.119*** 0.074*** 0.120*** 0.155*** 0.200***
[0.015] [0.017] [0.015] [0.017] [0.019] [0.021]
1-2 hours per day 0.066*** 0.182*** 0.065*** 0.183*** 0.167*** 0.285***
[0.016] [0.018] [0.016] [0.018] [0.020] [0.022]
More than 2 hours per day 0.026 0.233*** 0.025 0.234*** 0.169*** 0.377***
[0.018] [0.021] [0.018] [0.021] [0.022] [0.024]
Reported TV use (omitted=none):
Less than 1 hour per day 0.001 0.038** -0.003 0.038** 0.022 0.066***
[0.016] [0.017] [0.016] [0.017] [0.020] [0.021]
2 hours per day 0.029* 0.058*** 0.023 0.057*** 0.084*** 0.120***
[0.017] [0.017] [0.017] [0.017] [0.020] [0.021]
3 hours per day 0.008 0.047*** 0.001 0.047*** 0.061*** 0.109***
[0.017] [0.018] [0.017] [0.018] [0.021] [0.022]
4-5 hours per day 0.000 0.053*** -0.006 0.051*** 0.061*** 0.121***
[0.018] [0.019] [0.018] [0.019] [0.022] [0.024]
6 hours or more per day -0.036* 0.014 -0.040** 0.014 -0.004 0.050*
[0.019] [0.021] [0.019] [0.021] [0.023] [0.026]
Lagged achievement 0.758*** 0.752*** 0.762*** 0.758***
[0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006]
Class size 0.008* 0.003 0.007* 0.002 0.002 0.000
[0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.005] [0.004]
Black teacher -0.016 0.006 -0.034 0.007 0.008 0.009
[0.021] [0.021] [0.023] [0.023] [0.023] [0.026]
Hispanic teacher -0.100 0.063 -0.098 0.029 0.096 0.249***
[0.092] [0.096] [0.077] [0.102] [0.135] [0.088]
Other race teacher -0.071 0.042 -0.143** -0.004 -0.079 -0.03
[0.063] [0.056] [0.065] [0.041] [0.080] [0.104]
Male teacher -0.002 -0.031* 0.006 -0.023 -0.022 -0.028
[0.022] [0.017] [0.023] [0.020] [0.025] [0.027]
Teacher experience (base=0 years)
1-2 years experience 0.071*** 0.021 0.092*** 0.009 0.049* 0.035
[0.023] [0.021] [0.026] [0.026] [0.030] [0.034]
3-5 years experience 0.094*** 0.054*** 0.103*** 0.009 0.046 0.058*
[0.024] [0.021] [0.027] [0.026] [0.030] [0.033]
6-12 years experience 0.089*** 0.071*** 0.113*** 0.060** 0.046 0.077**
[0.023] [0.021] [0.027] [0.025] [0.030] [0.033]
13-20 years experience 0.122*** 0.080*** 0.149*** 0.061** 0.082*** 0.103***
[0.025] [0.023] [0.029] [0.027] [0.032] [0.035]
20-27 years experience 0.123*** 0.078*** 0.153*** 0.065** 0.072** 0.107***
[0.024] [0.021] [0.027] [0.026] [0.030] [0.033]
>27 years experience 0.152*** 0.116*** 0.173*** 0.096*** 0.100*** 0.096***
[0.027] [0.024] [0.031] [0.027] [0.034] [0.035]
Quality of teacher's college (base=less competitive)
very competitive college -0.012 0.003 -0.005 0.010 0.000 0.016
[0.023] [0.017] [0.025] [0.019] [0.026] [0.026]
competitive college -0.005 -0.001 -0.006 -0.004 -0.037** -0.005
[0.013] [0.012] [0.015] [0.014] [0.016] [0.017]
unranked college -0.008 0.033 -0.025 0.013 -0.104 0.03653
[0.036] [0.041] [0.038] [0.036] [0.069] [0.077]
Teacher with advanced
degree
-0.020 -0.004 -0.018 -0.005 -0.018 -0.020
[0.014] [0.012] [0.015] [0.014] [0.016] [0.017]
Teacher Nat'l Board
Certified
-0.022 0.006 -0.055 0.019 -0.030 -0.007
[0.033] [0.029] [0.034] [0.032] [0.040] [0.044]
Teacher's licensure test score 0.013* 0.001 0.015* -0.006 0.008 -0.001
[0.007] [0.007] [0.008] [0.008] [0.009] [0.010]
subgroup dummy -0.097* 0.036 0.024 -0.100 0.522*** 0.657***
[0.059] [0.069] [0.059] [0.066] [0.074] [0.000]
Interactions with subgroup dummy
Class size 0.003 0.001 -0.002 0.000 0.009*** 0.005*
[0.002] [0.003] [0.002] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003]
Black teacher -0.019 0.002 0.041* -0.002 -0.038 -0.013
[0.023] [0.026] [0.023] [0.028] [0.028] [0.032]
Hispanic teacher -0.059 -0.016 0.084 0.102 -0.221*** -0.234**
[0.097] [0.200] [0.085] [0.163] [0.060] [0.109]
Other race teacher -0.065 0.009 0.178** 0.091 0.071 0.164
[0.061] [0.102] [0.078] [0.072] [0.081] [0.111]
Male teacher 0.010 -0.050* -0.014 0.022 0.02 0.013
[0.029] [0.029] [0.024] [0.026] [0.031] [0.035]
Teacher experience (base=0 years)
1-2 years experience 0.021 0.012 -0.039 0.016 0.021 -0.039
[0.032] [0.038] [0.029] [0.036] [0.037] [0.042]
3-5 years experience 0.038 0.05 -0.033 0.043 0.057 -0.041
[0.032] [0.036] [0.029] [0.034] [0.036] [0.039]
6-12 years experience 0.015 0.018 -0.041 0.011 0.042 -0.055
[0.029] [0.035] [0.028] [0.033] [0.035] [0.038]
13-20 years experience 0.030 0.02 -0.055* 0.026 0.026 -0.091**
[0.031] [0.037] [0.029] [0.035] [0.037] [0.041]
20-27 years experience 0.062** -0.003 -0.083*** 0.028 0.053 -0.052
[0.030] [0.036] [0.029] [0.035] [0.036] [0.041]
>27 years experience 0.063* 0.054 -0.068** 0.004 0.046 -0.012
[0.034] [0.040] [0.034] [0.037] [0.042] [0.042]
Quality of teacher's college (base=less competitive)
very competitive college -0.021 -0.019 0.003 -0.002 -0.027 -0.019
[0.029] [0.027] [0.028] [0.025] [0.031] [0.033]
competitive college 0.022 -0.017 -0.015 0.014 0.048** 0.030
[0.016] [0.017] [0.016] [0.017] [0.019] [0.021]
unranked college 0.163*** 0.019 -0.095* 0.013 0.111* 0.031
[0.061] [0.064] [0.049] [0.056] [0.061] [0.077]
Teacher with advanced
degree
0.010 0.003 -0.009 -0.004 -0.005 0.026
[0.017] [0.018] [0.018] [0.018] [0.021] [0.021]
Teacher Nat'l Board
Certified
0.040 0.001 0.027 -0.029 -0.031 0.001
[0.035] [0.048] [0.032] [0.041] [0.054] [0.063]
Teacher's licensure test score 0.002 -0.002 -0.003 0.014 0.016 0.014
[0.009] [0.009] [0.009] [0.009] [0.011] [0.012]
Observations 24,768 24,711 24,970 24,912 25,147 25,045
R
2 0.766 0.708 0.765 0.707 0.654 0.590
Note: Robust standard errors in brackets.54
* denotes a coefficient significant at the 10% level; ** 5%; *** 1%